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World War 2:
War in the Southern and Southwestern Pacific
Although this section deals in detail only with the
Southern and Southwestern Pacific, it is in effect a chronicle of the
war against Japan, for events in other areas are treated broadly in
their chronological relationship. These events are discussed in detail
in sections 10. War in the Central and Northern Pacific and 11. War
in Eastern Asia.
Japanese Dreams of Empire
The Japanese began their efforts to establish a Greater
East Asia Coprosperity Sphere as early as 1931. Seizing a minor pretext,
they then overran Manchuria and, in 1932, established it as a puppet
state under the name of Manchukuo. Incursions into China proper followed.
These were initially successful, but eventually the Japanese encountered
the stubborn resistance of the Chinese, who were united under the central
government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The crisis came in 1937,
when a major offensive was launched to reduce China to submission. After
overrunning large areas of northern China, the Japanese found that they
could not break the Chinese will to resist, and a policy of economic
strangulation was adopted. By 1939 they had seized the major coastal
ports and had forced the removal of the Chinese capital inland from
Nanking to Hankow and then to Chungking.
In 1940, Japanese pressure on the weak Vichy government
of conquered France brought important concessions in Indochina, including
the right of entry of Japanese troops. Japan's formal entry into the
Axis alliance with the signature of the Tripartite Pact in September
1940 provided convincing proof of her ultimate aims. A treaty was concluded
with Thailand (Siam), and by the end of 1940 the Japanese were threatening
the Burma Road , the last important supply line from the outside world
to China. In April 1941, Japan signed a five-year nonaggression pact
with the USSR, and in July she completed the-occupation of French Indochina.
Her thoughts now turned to the so-called Southern Regions ( the Philippines,
Borneo, the Moluccas, Celebes or Sulawesi, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya,
Thailand, and Burma), an area extremely rich in raw materials.
Alarmed by the Japanese movements and ambitions, the
United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, whose territories
Japan coveted, joined in freezing her assets in their respective countries,
thereby effectively curtailing her trade. It had long been obvious to
the Japanese that the establishment of the Greater East Asia Coprosperity
Sphere would result in conflict with the Occidental powers. Now the
crisis was at hand.
Road to War
The stringent economic restrictions put into effect
by the United States in 1940-1941 made it impossible for Japan to import
the raw materials required for war production. She now faced the alternatives
of either abandoning her ambitions for empire or making herself self-sufficient
through the seizure of the Southern Regions. The former course was unthinkable,
while the latter seemed a simple venture under existing circumstances.
The British, American, and Netherlands forces confronting Japan were
weak. The possibility of British and Dutch reinforcements arriving in
strength in Asia or the East Indies was remote, for the Netherlands
was in German hands and the British were struggling for survival in
the Middle East. Even the USSR was reeling under German attacks. The
United States was far from being mobilized and was committed through
its lend-lease program to the support of the nations aligned against
Germany and Italy.
Certainly the time was ripe for Japan to act with vigor
and celerity if her dreams of empire were to be realized. Several years
would be required for the United States and Great Britain to muster
their full strength in the Pacific, years during which Japan could seize
and develop the resources of the Far East and make herself impregnable
against counterattack. Four years of campaigning in China had inured
her soldiers to the rigors of war. Guns, tanks, planes, and other equipment
had been tested in combat. In the many amphibious operations against
Chinese ports the Japanese had developed skill in the type of war which
they would encounter and had mastered the close coordination of land,
sea, and air power.
By Dec. 7, 1941, the Japanese Army had grown to a force
of 2,400,000 trained men and 3,000,000 partially trained Reserves. .The
air fleet consisted of 7,500 planes ( including 2,675 first-line planes)
, which were divided about equally between the army and the navy. The
rate of new plane construction was 425 monthly, and additional pilots
were being trained at a rate of 2,750 a year. Dissatisfied with the
lesser role assigned her by the other powers, Japan in 1934 had denounced
the naval agreements of 1922 and 1930, and had secretly increased the
strength of her navy to 230 major vessels.
West of Hawaii the Allies could oppose this formidable
Japanese war machine with approximately 350,000 poorly equipped ground
troops, about 90 warships, and less than 1,000 planes, most of which
were obsolete. This force, largely untrained and inexperienced and composed
of a mixture of nationalities with divergent customs, languages, and
interests, was scattered across the Pacific and Southeast Asia from
Wake Island to Burma and from Hong Kong to Australia. The principal
centers of Allied strength in the Far East were located in Malaya and
the Philippines.
The strength of the Japanese armed forces was enhanced
by their strategic disposition. The mandated islands in the Central
Pacific, which had been secretly fortified, provided excellent bases
for operations to the east against Hawaii, to the west against the Philippines,
and to the south against New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Australia.
American Guam and Wake Island were unfortified and could he taken easily.
Bases on the China coast and airfields on Taiwan (Formosa), the Ryukyu
Islands, and the home islands provided a safe channel for Japanese ship
movements southward. The Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina
in July 1941 furnished bases for easy access to Malaya and the key British
naval base at Singapore. The Philippines, the principal American outpost
in the Far East, were hemmed in on three sides by bases in the Palau
group, Taiwan, Hainan, Spratly Island, and French Indochina. Hong Kong,
which with Singapore and Manila constituted the foundation of Anglo-Saxon
power and influence in the Far East, was isolated by a strong cordon
of Japanese troops and by bases on Taiwan and Hainan.
The scene for the drive to the south had been well set,
but Japan had her Achilles' heel-her merchant marine, which had grown
to 6,100,000 tons. An industrial island nation like Great Britain, she
needed to import large quantities of unprocessed materials for home
consumption and for the manufacture of war goods; and support of the
contemplated military operations would double the burden. Japan could
fulfill her shipping requirements as long as undue losses were not experienced,
but there was no margin of safety. The ravaging of Japan's merchant
marine by American aircraft, submarines, and surface warships was to
prove a decisive factor in her eventual defeat.
By December 1941, the United States Army had reached
a strength of about 1,500,000 men, of whom 1,000,000 were not completely
trained. The Army Air Forces had 1,157 first-line combat aircraft, of
which 159 were four-engine bombers. The Navy consisted of 347 warships,
and an ambitious expansion program was on the ways. American merchant
shipping aggregated more than 10,000,000 tons and was growing rapidly.
Nevertheless, the state of American preparedness was gravely affected
by the commitment of a large portion of war production to the conflict
in Europe.
Japanese War Plan
As the time for war approached, the military hierarchy
dominated Japan economically and politically as well as militarily.
The basic war plan of Imperial General Headquarters was divided into
three phases. Phase 1 included neutralization of the United States Pacific
Fleet at Pearl Harbor, seizure of the Southern Regions, and establishment
of a defensive perimeter to protect these regions and the Japanese homeland.
Phase 2 consisted of the consolidation and strengthening of the perimeter
with a string of fortified bases extending from the Kuril Islands through
Wake Island, the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago,
northern New Guinea, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya, and Borneo. Phase
3 embraced the interception and destruction of any attacking forces
that might attempt to penetrate the defensive perimeter, and the waging
of a war of attrition to destroy the will to fight of the United States,
the principal antagonist.
With her western flank protected by the occupation of
the China coast and her northern flank by the neutralization of the
USSR through a nonaggression pact, Japan could apply maximum pressure
toward the south and east. The only real threat to the Japanese war
plan was the United States Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor. The
first operation would therefore be the neutralization of this fleet
by means of a surprise air attack. The First Air Fleet, a strategically
mobile striking force built around 6 fast aircraft carriers, was assigned
this task. Once the strike at Pearl Harbor had been successfully completed,
strong air attacks, preliminary to invasion, were to be launched against
the Philippines and Malaya to destroy the principal Allied concentrations
of airpower in the Far East. Air blows would also be struck against
Hong Kong, Wake, and Guam.
The main Japanese attack was to be the drive to seize
the Southern Regions. The offensive would begin with a two-pronged thrust,
one prong being directed against Malaya and the other against the Philippines.
At the same time, Guam, Wake, Hong Kong, British Borneo, and Thailand
were to be occupied; and advance bases were to be established in the
Bismarck Archipelago, Netherlands Borneo (Kalimantan), Celebes, the
Moluccas, and Timor. After the capture of Malaya and the Philippines,
the two main forces were to be combined for the invasion of Java, the
heart of the Netherlands East Indies. By then the First Air Fleet would
have completed its operations in the Central Pacific and could lend
its overwhelming power to the assault. At an opportune time, large-scale
operations would be undertaken in Burma with the primary object of cutting
the Burma Road. Upon the successful completion of these campaigns, the
first-phase objectives would have been attained. The second and third
phases would follow, and Japan would then revert to the strategic defensive,
prepared to counter the eventual assaults of the United States and Great
Britain.
This plan for the simultaneous conduct of many far-flung
operations violated the cardinal military principle of concentrated
application of combat power, but in view of Allied weakness such an
unorthodox strategy was sound. Striking everywhere at once not only
would exploit the essential element of surprise, but would place the
Allies on the defensive on all fronts and confuse them as to the true
Japanese objectives. It would take advantage also of the Allies' divergent
selfinterests and thus hinder any attempt to combine and concentrate
available defensive forces during the first phase. The military leaders
were confident that once Japan dominated the entire Far East, the Allies,
operating at the end of long supply lines and lacking well-developed
advance bases, would find reconquest a difficult and prolonged, if not
impossible, task.
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