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World War 2:
Invasion in the South and Drive to the East
Invasion of Southern France
Pursuit Toward the German Frontier
German Reorganization and Allied Supply Problems
Operations in the Netherlands and on the Franco German
Border
Invasion of Southern France
Even as Allied troops swept victoriously across Normandy,
another Allied force staged a second amphibious invasion on August 15,
this time on the south coast of France between Cannes and Toulon. This
was the long-postponed Operation Anvil (also known as Operation Dragoon).
Though Eisenhower in the spring of 1944 had recommended that this invasion
not be launched at the same time as the landings in Normandy, he wished
only to gain additional landing craft for the major invasion, and neither
the Allied commander nor other American officials endorsed abandoning
the operation altogether. Against British resistance, notably from Churchill,
who continued to favor expanded operations in other parts of the Mediterranean,
Eisenhower had continued to believe an invasion of southern France essential
to the success of Overlord.
Allied entry into Rome two days before the Normandy
invasion at last made it clear beyond doubt that some resources could
be spared from the Mediterranean to assist Overlord. After considering
various operations, including an invasion of the southwest coast of
France, Allied planners finally decided to strike the south coast on
August 15, though all British objections did not end until shortly before
the target date. The invasion was designed to prevent German forces
in the south from moving against Overlord and to provide the Allies
with a supplementary line of supply through the Mediterranean ports,
particularly Marseille.
Behind a heavy air and naval bombardment three United
States divisions (the 3d, 36th, and 45th) under the 6th Corps, commanded
by Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Lucian K. Truscott, and an attached French
armored force began landing early on the morning of August 15 on either
side of St.-Tropez. Meanwhile, a task force composed of American and
British paratroopers landed behind the invasion beaches to cut roads
and isolate the German defenders. The over-all commander was Maj. Gen.
(later Lt. Gen.) Alexander M. Patch, commander of the United States
Seventh Army. The German force responsible for defending southern France,
Army Group G under General Blaskowitz, had only 11 divisions for the
task. Though the German High Command had been considering the withdrawal
of Army Group G to the north; no action had been taken when the invasion
came. Their forces spread thin, the Germans could muster only spotty
resistance on the beaches. Two days later, OKW ordered Blaskowitz to
leave forces to hold the major ports and pull back toward the Vosges
Mountains in northeastern France.
The success of the Allied invasion was spectacular.
On the first day alone, 86,000 men, 12,000 vehicles, and 46,000 tons
of supplies were put ashore. In only a few days the United States divisions
were fanning out from the beaches and heading north up the Route Napoleon
toward Grenoble. Under Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, a follow-up
French force (later designated the French First Army) swung westward
against Toulon and Marseille, where stubborn resistance ended on August
28. On the same day troops of the 6th Corps seized Montelimar, 75 miles
up the valley of the Rhone River, but were too late to trap German columns
withdrawing from southwestern France. In two weeks the Allies nevertheless
had opened two major ports and had taken 57,000 prisoners at a cost
of only 4,000 French and 2,700 American casualties. American and French
columns soon were matching the sweeping advances in northern France.
French resistance forces swarming from the mountains aided the drive
materially. As Lyon fell on September 3, the Allied forces turned northeastward
toward the Belfort gap. On September 11, patrols from the southern force
met patrols of Eisenhower's northern force near Dijon. Four days later,
the troops in the south, organized now as the Sixth Army Group under
the command of General Devers and composed of the United States Seventh
and French First armies, came under General Eisenhower's command.
The invasion of southern France and the subsequent drive
north succeeded beyond all expectations. The Germans lost 80,000 men
in prisoners alone, while Allied casualties totaled 7,200, about equally
divided between Americans and French. On the other hand, the Germans
by their timely withdrawal managed to extricate more than half of Army
Group G from entrapment. Having reached the foothills of the Vosges,
the Germans turned to fight back. Though the Allies continued their
attacks, a shortened German defensive line and overstrained Allied supply
resources brought the sweeping gains to an end.
Pursuit Toward the German Frontier
In the meantime, the main Allied armies in the north,
having captured Paris and jumped the Seine on August 25, continued to
pursue the Germans across northern France and Belgium toward the German
border. In preinvasion planning, General Eisenhower had decided to advance
against Germany on a broad front. He planned to make his main effort
in the north through Belgium, passing Montgomery's Twenty-first Army
Group to the north of the barrier of the forested Ardennes region of
Belgium and Luxembourg along the most direct route to the Ruhr industrial
area, the vast collection of coal mines and factories which was the
main source of German industrial strength. Bradley's Twelfth Army Group
was to advance south of the Ardennes through a lesser industrial area,
the Saar. Yet as the extent of the German defeat became apparent, Eisenhower
yielded to persistent demands from Montgomery to strengthen the forces
in the north. Leaving Patton's Third Army to advance alone south of
the Ardennes, he ordered Bradley to send Hodges' First Army north of
the barrier alongside the British flank. This, Eisenhower reasoned,
would speed Montgomery's capture of ports along the Channel, including
the great port of Antwerp (Antwerpen). Another big port was essential
to continued advance into Germany, for Brest, Cherbourg, and even Le
Havre soon would be far behind the front. As General Crerar's Canadian
First Army invested the minor Channel ports, Montgomery's troops dashed
into Brussels (Bruxelles) on September 3 and the next day seized Antwerp.
In the process, British and Canadians overran the V-1 launching sites
which had been bombarding Britain since June. Though Antwerp fell with
wharves and docks intact, the big port could not be used until the Germans
were cleared from the banks of the Scheldt (Escaut; Schelde) Estuary,
leading 60 miles to the sea. The British failed to turn a force immediately
to this task.
The United States First Army meanwhile took Mons, Belgium,
on September 3, trapping there 25,000 Germans who were trying to flee
from the Channel coast, and then turned eastward toward Germany. Two
days later, one corps was across the Meuse River. Liege fell on September
7, and the capital city of Luxembourg on September 10. As in France,
resistance fighters materialized at many points, here preventing the
retreating Germans from blowing a bridge, there dismantling a roadblock
before the tank-led American columns arrived. On September 11, patrols
of Gerow's 5th Corps crossed onto German soil. Patton's Third Army meanwhile
captured Reims and Chalons on August 29, took Verdun, St.-Mihiel, and
Commercy on August 31, and on September 7 established a bridgehead over
the Moselle (Mosel) River south of Metz.
German Reorganization and Allied Supply Problems
As patrols of the First Army crossed the German frontier
and the troops from the invasion of southern France linked with those
of Overlord, an early end to the war appeared not only possible but
probable. The ragged columns falling back to the 'German border seemed
thoroughly beaten, and on the eastern front Soviet armies, having driven
the Germans from Russian soil, had begun to press into Poland. In the
three months since the Allies had landed in Normandy, the Germans on
all fronts had incurred more than 1,210,000 casualties. Day and night,
British and American heavy bombers hammered German cities, factories,
and rail lines. To many it seemed incredible that the divisions in the
west, reduced to no more than half the strength of the 49 divisions
which General Eisenhower had arrayed against them, could be rebuilt
fast enough to forestall total defeat. Even most German commanders saw
the only hope to be quick withdrawal behind the historic moat of the
Rhine River.
On the other hand, Hitler from his position as over-all
commander recognized that his Third Reich still possessed considerable
power. He still had, for example, more than 10 million men in uniform.
Despite Allied bombings, German factories still had been able to maintain
a high rate of production and had yet to reach their wartime peak. Recognizing
early in the summer that Germany could not hope to match the numbers
of Allied tanks, Hitler had concentrated instead on producing heavier
tanks that he considered tactically superior. These he ordered to be
used to equip panzer brigades that might halt or delay the Allied armies
until the shattered panzer divisions could be refitted and reorganized.
By reducing the numbers of service troops, by converting sailors and
airmen into infantrymen, and by at once lowering and extending the ages
for induction into the armed forces, he ordered the early formation
of 25 new divisions, all to support the western front. He also ordered
into the line along the frontier 100 so-called fortress infantry battalions,
heretofore used only in rear areas. Though Hitler could not hope to
produce enough new airplanes to redress the tremendous imbalance in
the air, he continued to put his faith in the early appearance of new
jet-propelled planes. He also put considerable faith in a series of
fortifications along the western border known as the West Wall. Called
by the Allies the Siegfried Line, the fortifications had been constructed
before the war from Switzerland to the point where the Rhine enters
the Netherlands. As much as 3 miles deep, the line consisted of hundreds
of concrete pillboxes, observation posts, command posts, and troop shelters.
Either such natural antitank obstacles as streams or concrete projections
called dragon's teeth fronted the entire length.
Looking for a new commander who might rebuild the morale
of the German soldier in the west, Hitler on September 5 recalled Field
Marshal von Rundstedt as commander in chief. While Field Marshal Model
remained as commander of Army Group B, Hitler charged Rundstedt with
holding firm along the Dutch-Belgian border, in the West Wall, and along
the Moselle River. As many as possible of the panzer divisions were
to be regrouped quickly to counterattack into the south flank of the
United States Third Army to cut off Patton's armored columns. The strength
of the West Wall, when supplemented by the counterattack and the other
emergency steps, would be sufficient, Hitler believed, to hold the Allies
along the border until he could form a larger reserve force to strike
back in a big counteroffensive. By means of the counteroffensive, he
intended to force the Allies to settle for a negotiated peace, whereupon
he might give his full attention to the Soviet Union.
A strong factor in Hitler's confidence was his belief
that the Allies had outrun their supply lines. In this he was correct,
though General Eisenhower and his subordinates hoped to get past the
West Wall and establish bridgeheads over the Rhine before a pause became
imperative. Eisenhower's problem was not a shortage of supplies on the
Continent but a task of getting them to the forward troops, who in some
cases were more than 500 miles from supply depots. The problem grew
out of the explosive nature of the advance through France and the decision
to forego a pause at the Seine, which had denied the supply services
time to build an orderly logistical structure. Despite such extraordinary
measures as the establishment of a one-way truck route called the Red
Ball Express, the supply troops simply could not keep pace. For five
days at the end of August, Patton's Third Army came to a complete halt
at the Meuse for lack of gasoline, General Hodges of the First Army
had to halt one corps for the same reason, and one British corps had
to stop for more than a week to enable its trucks to supply the rest
of the Second Army. Some idea of the immensity of the supply requirements
is apparent from the fact that each division required 600 to 700 tons
of supplies per day and that artillery and mortars expended ammunition
at the rate of 8,000,000 rounds per month, almost as much as the entire
American Expeditionary Force expended (10,000,000 rounds) in World War
I.
Operations in the Netherlands and on the Franco German Border
In the light of the supply problems, Eisenhower's continued
determination to proceed into Germany on a broad front seemed to two
of his subordinates a mistake. Montgomery insisted vehemently that Eisenhower
should concentrate all his resources behind one part of the front, preferably
in the north, and make one sustained drive all the way to Berlin. General
Patton resisted the idea just as strongly and insisted instead that,
if given proper support, his Third Army could gain the Rhine in a matter
of days. Though Eisenhower rejected both arguments, he nevertheless
sanctioned a plan put forward by Montgomery to use 3 airborne divisions
to help the British Second Army across three major water obstacles in
the Netherlands: the Maas (Meuse), Waal, and Lower Rhine (Neder Rijn)
rivers. This accomplished, Montgomery might outflank the West Wall and
gain a position from which he might drive into the North German plain
to encircle the Ruhr from the north. In the meantime, the Sixth Army
Group, using separate supply routes, was to continue through the Vosges
to the upper Rhine, the Third Army was to drive into the Saar, and Hodges'
First Army was to penetrate the West Wall at Aachen and gain a bridgehead
over the Rhine near Cologne (Koln).
When Montgomery first proposed the airborneassisted
drive through the Netherlands, the Germans had almost no forces in a
position to block it. Before the operation could be launched, however,
Hitler rushed forward headquarters of the First Parachute Army under
Col. Gen. Kurt Student to gather the fleeing troops and build a line
along the Dutch canals. He also ordered into position several divisions
from a 60,000-man force of the Fifteenth Army, which had escaped entrapment
on the Channel coast by ferrying across the Scheldt Estuary after the
fall of Antwerp.
The big airborne attack, labeled Operation Market, began
on September 17. Under Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton's First Allied Airborne
Army, 3 divisions-the British 1st and the United States 82d and 101st-landed
near Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Eindhoven in the largest airborne operation
of the war. The airborne troops were to seize a narrow corridor 65 miles
deep to enable the Second Army, in a companion ground attack called
Operation Garden, to pass through and reach the IJsselmeer (Zuider Zee),
thereby cutting off all German forces in the western Netherlands. Though
the airborne drops were uniformly successful and achieved full surprise,
the British ground column ran into stubborn resistance and blown bridges
that created serious delays. Before the ground forces could break through
to the British airborne division at Arnhem, the farthest unit from the
original front line, the Germans threw in remnants of 2 panzer divisions
that had been reorganizing nearby. As the Germans pinned the British
airborne troops to a narrow bridgehead north of the Lower Rhine, Montgomery
ordered the commitment of a Polish airborne brigade, but to no avail.
On September 25-26, the battered survivors (2,000 men out of an original
force of not quite 9,000) withdrew to the south bank of the river.
The outcome of Market-Garden in itself would have been
enough to demonstrate that the big pursuit was over, but, in addition,
all Allied armies had run into trouble. Facing the German Nineteenth
Army, which was strengthened by the forested foothills of the Vosges,
the Sixth Army Group could make only limited gains. Though the Hitler-ordered
counterattack against Patton's south flank was doomed from the start
by inadequate strength and hasty mounting, sizable advances by the Third
Army were thwarted by a staunchly defended Moselle River line and by
old but formidable forts around Metz. Both at Aachen and in the Ardennes
the First Army pierced the West Wall in several places, but General
Hodges' forces were too greatly extended to exploit the gains. As September
passed into October, Allied armies everywhere had bogged down. While
the logistical situation began to improve with time, the German hold
on the banks of the Scheldt Estuary continued to deny the use of Antwerp
as a port, and until Antwerp could be opened, no sustained offensive
could be maintained. Though Montgomery chafed at the assignment of opening
Antwerp, preferring instead to make a new attempt to reach the Ruhr
from the corridor opened by Operation Market-Garden, he at last turned
his full attention to the task in mid-October. Yet it would be a long
time before the first Allied ship dropped anchor at Antwerp. Flooding
much of the low lying countryside, the Germans fought tenaciously until
November 8, inflicting nearly 13,000 casualties on the Canadian First
Army. Because the Scheldt Estuary still had to be cleared of mines,
Antwerp did not begin functioning as a port until November 28.
In the meantime, encouraged by a steady though unspectacular
improvement in the supply situation, Eisenhower had ordered a new offensive
to begin in early November, with the main effort to be made by the First
Army around Aachen. General Simpson's Ninth Army, which had been moved
forward from Brittany, made a supporting attack on the left, while the
Third Army launched a similar thrust from the vicinity of Metz. On November
16, the heaviest air bombardment in direct support of troops on the
ground to be launched during the war began east of Aachen in support
of the First and Ninth armies (Operation Queen). More than 4,000 planes,
including 2,400 heavy bombers, dropped over 10,000 tons of bombs on
German defenses and communications centers in an effort to repeat the
success of the breakout from Normandy. Unfortunately for the success
of the attack, Allied commanders had attempted to cover too broad a
target area and, in an effort to avoid repeating the costly errors of
bombs' falling short in Normandy, had allowed too great an interval
between the attacking troops and the bomb line. By the time the ground
troops could cross this interval, the Germans had recovered sufficiently
to reman their posts.
It took all the rest of November and part of December
for the First and Ninth armies to build up their forces along the Roer
(Rur) River, in places only 7 miles beyond the line from which the offensive
began. Even then the armies were powerless to cross the Roer, for a
series of dams on its upper reaches remained in German hands and might
be blown to flood the valley and trap any force which had moved east
of the river.
Farther south the French First Army and the United States Third and
Seventh armies had made greater gains, though the Germans still yielded
ground only grudgingly. By the end of the first week in December, the
two armies of the Sixth Army Group had compressed the Germans into a
large bridgehead west of the Rhine based on the city of Colmar (the
so-called Colmar pocket), and the Third Army had reached the West Wall
along the face of the Saar. The British and Canadians meanwhile had
cleared all of the Netherlands south and west of the Maas.
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