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World War 2:
Between World Wars - End of the Long Armistice
Spanish Civil War
Sino-Japanese War
The Axis and the Anschluss
Czech Crisis
Berchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg
Munich
End of Appeasement
Nazi-Soviet Pact
Final Crisis
Spanish Civil War
Hardly were the Ethiopian and Rhineland crises out of
mind when a new storm swept the stage. In Spanish Moroccg on July 17,
1936, so-called Nationalists launched a revolution against the Popular
Front government of the five-year old Spanish Republic (garrisons in
Spain proper rose the next day). Championing ideas much like those of
the Fascists and Nazis, they applied immediately to Rome and Berlin
for aid. The republicans or Loyalists (as they became known) with equal
alacrity applied for help to Paris, where the May elections had given
victory to the Popular Front and made Leon Blum, a Socialist, premier
in June. From the outset the Spanish Civil War was a European problem.
Italy and Germany both agreed promptly to act. Italian
ships and planes were soon aiding Nationalist troops to cross from Morocco
to the Iberian Peninsula, and before long Italians and Germans were
actually fighting in the Nationalist ranks. On November 28, Mussolini
signed with the Nationalist leader, Gen. Francisco Franco, a pact providing
that Italian aid should be recompensed by economic cooperation, political
cooperation in the western Mediterranean, and "benevolent neutrality"
on the part of Spain in a general war. Later, on March 20, 1937, Hitler
entered into an agreement with Franco that promised consultations in
the event of a European war and guaranteed the export to Germany of
quantities of Spanish provisions and raw materials.
At first the French government was disposed to give
aid to the republicans, and, indeed, Premier Blum immediately authorized
sales of aircraft and munitions. But counsels of caution soon came to
the fore. With little of the regular army loyal to it, the Spanish Republic
seemed unlikely to survive. Since the Spanish Popular Front was somewhat
more radical than the French, its cabinet was viewed askance by some
members of the.. Blum government. Officials of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs warned furthermore that assistance to the republicans would
probably lead to increased Italian and German assistance to the Nationalists,
and that the eventual outcome might well be a general European war.
This last consideration was pressed on the French by their British allies.
Many in the majority Conservative Party felt that Britain's position
should be "a plague o' both your houses." While most Liberals
and Labourites praised the republic and damned the Nationalists, few
argued that British interests were involved in the civil war. The Baldwin
cabinet therefore had mass support in adopting the position that the
aim of the democracies should be to quarantine Spain and prevent the
conflict from spreading.
Torn within and under pressure from London, the Blum
cabinet decided to take a similar stand. On Aug. 1, 1936, it proclaimed
a policy of nonintervention, declaring that the Spaniards should be
allowed to fight out their war without aid in men or materiel from any
other country and asking all other governments to join in this course.
A total of 27 nations, including Italy and Germany, agreed, and an international
Nonintervention Committee was established in London to keep watch on
the fulfillment of these pledges. In actuality the committee never proved
effective. The Italians and Germans continued more or less openly to
assist Franco, and the Soviet government, despite its promise to the
`contrary, contributed men and supplies to the republicans. Even the
French wavered from time to time, leaving the Pyrenees frontier open
on two occasions (in November 1937 and April-May 1938) for shipments
to the republic. Among the European powers only Britain was faithful
to the pledge. The United States, though not a party to it, followed
the British by applying its neutrality laws to the civil war. Partly
because Soviet and French aid to the republic was considerably less
than Italian and German aid to the Nationalists, partly because of military
advantages on Franco's side, and partly because of divisions among the
Loyalists, the Nationalists eventually triumphed. By the end of March
1939, Franco was master of nearly all of Spain.
The Spanish conflict was not the match that touched
off a new world war. It did, however, make tensions more acute. Even
among those in Britain, France, and the United States who continued
to regard nonintervention as a wise policy there were some who felt
that Spain represented one more victory for the totalitarian states,
and that this fact brought nearer the moment when their career of success
would have to be checked. Among the Italians and Germans it strengthened
the illusion that the democracies were weak willed and would not resist.
Sino-Japanese War
As the Spanish Civil War rounded out its first year,
a crisis arose in another part of the globe. Ever since they had created
the satellite state of Manchukuo, the Japanese had been discussing further
steps toward national expansion. Moderate factions had advocated the
use of peaceful means, particularly the application of economic pressure
to China, coupled with efforts to induce the Chinese government to accept
a client status. These measures had, however, been only partially successful.
Extremist groups had become increasingly restless, and the government
had edged steadily toward a more forceful policy.
On April 18, 1934, the official spokesman for the Foreign
Office, Eiji Amau, announced that any effort by a Western power to aid
China would be opposed by Japan. In effect, this declaration was a Japanese
Monroe Doctrine for eastern Asia. In December, Japan gave notice that
she would no longer be bound by the Washington Naval (Five-Power) Treaty
of 1922, which had stipulated that Japanese tonnage in capital ships
should not exceed three-fifths that of Britain or the United States.
After attempting unsuccessfully in 1935 to arrange for the secession
of the northern provinces of China and the establishment there of another
satellite state, the Japanese government on Aug. 11, 1936, devised a
new statement of "fundamental principles of a national policy,"
declaring Japan's destiny to be the dominating force in all of eastern
Asia.
Most of the powers with interests in the Far East failed
to respond with any vigor. The United States contented itself with mild
diplomatic protests, and while the British spoke of extending help to
China, they made no move to do so. Only the Soviet Union acted in such
a way as to indicate that it might at some point resist a Japanese advance.
On March 12, 1936, it signed a mutual defense pact with its client state,
Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic). More important, Soviet
dictator Joseph Stalin advised the Chinese Communists to make peace
with the central government and form a common front. Faced with these
gestures by the USSR, the Japanese government seized on a proposal from
the Germans and on November 25 signed with Hitler an Anti-Comintern
Pact. This agreement stipulated nothing more than that the two governments
exchange data about, and collaborate in suppressing, Communist activities.
Inevitably, however, other governments suspected that it contained secret
articles making the two nations allies. The result in both London and
Washington was to quicken apprehension concerning possible Japanese
aggressive moves. In April 1937, the British government began belatedly
to supply financial and technical assistance to China, and American
officials talked openly of doing likewise.
Rising prospects for foreign support of China, coupled
with various domestic developments, led the Japanese government to decide
that it could no longer achieve its objects by peaceful means. On July
7, 1937, taking advantage of a minor clash at the Marco Polo Bridge
near Peiping ( Peking) , the Japanese Army opened a large-scale invasion
of China. The other powers still did not act. Britain and the United
States delivered diplomatic protests, and on October 6 the League Assembly
voted to condemn Japan's action but not to brand it as aggression and
not therefore to invoke sanctions. Speaking at Chicago on the previous
day, Roosevelt had said that an "epidemic of world lawlessness"
was spreading and suggested that, as with an epidemic disease, it might
be met by a "quarantine." It soon became clear, however, that
he would not go on to advocate combined action against Japan. Instead
a meeting was called in Brussels of the 18 nations that had adhered
to the Nine-Power Treaty, signed in Washington in 1922 and promising
respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative
integrity of China. From this meeting issued, on November 24, nothing
more than an exhortation to Japan to mend her ways. The Soviet Union
for its part was caught up in a domestic crisis, the result of which
was a purge of the leading generals in the army. In August 1938, its
forces did engage in a 10-day skirmish with Japanese troops that had
infringed the Soviet border. Aside from sending a trickle of aid to
the Chinese, however, no power did anything more.
The Japanese were able in 18 months to overrun the area
around Peiping, the central Yangtze Basin, and most of the coast of
southern China. By the end of 1938 they controlled the richest portions
of the country and exercised sway over nearly half its population. In
uneasy cooperation with the Communists the Chinese central government
was organizing itself for prolonged resistance, and, in fact, war was
to continue for more than eight years. Nevertheless, the Japanese aggression
seemed at the time to have been an overwhelming success. And in view
of the association of the Japanese with the Germans ( and after Nov.
6, 1937, with the Italians) in the Anti-Comintern Pact, their triumph
seemed another score on the side of the totalitarian states, another
encouragement to them, another warning to the democracies.
The Axis and the Anschluss
Even before the Sino-Japanese War the French and British
had begun to take some action. Military authorities in both countries
estimated (probably erroneously) that the Germans had a long lead in
preparations for war. To bring themselves abreast the French decided
in October 1936 to undertake a four-year rearmament program, and the
British followed their example. The two governments also gave fresh
thought to the possibility of redressing the balance by finding allies.
Aware of the isolationism of the United States, suspicious of Soviet
communism, and apprehensive that in any case the army purges of 1937
might have weakened the USSR, they turned inevitably to the idea of
allying themselves with Italy-of recreating the Stresa front. Mussolini,
however, had been drawing closer to Hitler. After both independently
gave aid to Franco, discussion arose about the possibility of cooperation
in wider spheres. Hitler, who had prophesied a German-Italian entente
in Mein Kampf, made the first overtures. In October 1936, the Italian
foreign minister, Conte Galeazzo Ciano, visited Germany and arrived
at vague understandings on common action against international communism.
On November 1, reacting viscerally to the British decision on rearmament,
the duce made a speech. In it he spoke of a "vertical line between
Rome and Berlin" that was "not a partition but rather an axis
round which all European states animated by the will to collaboration
and peace can also collaborate." Seizing on his words, commentators
soon coupled Italy and Germany as the Axis powers.
They were not yet formal allies. Indeed, from the French
and British standpoint, it seemed that they were far from being so.
After the settlement of the Ethiopian affair, Italy's paramount interests
appeared once again to lie in the Danubian region. And it was there
that Hitler seemed most likely to make his next move. He had continued
to give strong backing to the Austrian Nazis. In February 1938, through
pressure on Chancellor von Schuschnigg, he forced the appointment of
Nazis to key posts in the Austrian government. He and they talked openly
of an Anschluss: a political union. It remained to be seen whether Mussolini
would react again as he had in 1934. The Italian dictator did in fact
sound out the British government on the possibility of an accord. He
did not ask that Britain guarantee support against Germany, but merely
that it recognize his conquest of Ethiopia and reach an entente with
him on Mediterranean issues. This would be enough, he implied, to enable
him to stand up to Hitler on the Austrian question. Whether he was in
earnest or not remains doubtful. In any event, Foreign Secretary Eden
took the view that an understanding with Italy was impossible without
the termination of Italian intervention in Spain. Although the majority
of the cabinet disagreed with him and he resigned, there was so much
support for his position in the House of Commons that the government
felt compelled to go slowly.
Meanwhile, Hitler moved. On Nov. 5, 1937, he had disclosed
his thoughts to some of his principal political and military subordinates.
The next six to eight years, he said, would bring Germany to the peak
of her relative power. Thereafter rearmament by other nations, coupled
with the obsolescence of German weapons, would mean that any change
would be for the worse. "Germany's problem could only be solved
by means of force," he declared, and "it was his unalterable
resolve to solve Germany's problem of space at the latest by 1943-1945."
The first steps would be the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia.
After that the schedule would depend on circumstances. Morally sure
that Italy would not resist, he had made preparations to act against
Austria. His demand for the installation of Nazis in key posts in that
government was a first step. When Schuschnigg made a sign of defiance,
announcing a projected plebiscite in which the Austrian people would
register their desire to remain independent, Hitler sent an angry ultimatum
demanding its cancellation. Encouraged by Schuschnigg's compliance,
he then demanded that a Nazi be installed as chancellor. When rebuffed,
he directed Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Austrian Nazi minister of the
interior, to proclaim himself head of a provisional government and invite
German intervention. This was done. German troops crossed the border
early on March 12. On the following day, Anschluss was proclaimed, and
on March 14 Hitler himself was in Vienna. Having received no encouraging
reply from London, Mussolini had acquiesced, telling Hitler's envoy
that "Austria would be immaterial to him." Since the British
had taken the position even in 1934 that Austria was not' a direct concern
of theirs, they contented themselves with a strong diplomatic protest.
The French, embroiled in a domestic crisis and having only a caretaker
cabinet, were incapable of even contemplating action. In the series
of successes of the dictatorships the conquest of Austria was the most
rapid, the most complete, and the most feebly opposed.
Czech Crisis
It was clear to all the world that Czechoslovakia was
now in peril. German garrisons ringed its western frontiers, and the
German press and radio thundered about persecution suffered by the German
minority there. In the Sudetenland, where most of this minority resided,
a constant clamor was maintained by Nazi sympathizers whose leaders
plainly took their orders from Berlin. Reacting to evidence of German
troop concentrations; the Czechs on May 20, 1938, ordered the mobilization
of reserves along the German frontier. Their French ally stood by them,
warning the Germans not to attack. The British ambassador. in Berlin
added reinforcement by reminding the German Foreign Office that Britain
was an ally of France, and the Soviet• government declared that
it would live up to its alliance with Czechoslovakia. This so-called
May crisis proved short lived, for on May 22, Hitler sent to Prague
assurances that he was not concentrating troops and that he had no aggressive
designs.
Although this episode was frequently cited later as
an instance in which firmness by the other powers had forced Hitler
to back down, the fact was that the crisis was illusory. While the furer
intended eventually to move against Czechoslovakia, it had not been
in his mind to act so soon after the Anschluss. On April 21, he had
ordered the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW ) to bring up to date
plans for a Czech campaign, but the work was not completed until mid-May.
Hitler was, in fact, giving his approval to this document on the very
day when the Czechs mobilized, and the first words of his covering letter
were, "It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia in the immediate
future without provocation, unless an unavoidable development . within
Czechoslovakia forces the issue." If the May crisis had any result,
it m'ay have been to anger Hitler and incline him to advance his timetable.
His associates testified later that he was furious at having to give
assurances to the Czechs, and on May 30 he revised his directive to
read, "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
military action in the near future." Perhaps, too, the false sense
of having been at the very brink of war had a palsying effect on the
governments that had momentarily seemed so firm.
In succeeding weeks and months the British showed an
increasing disposition to arrange some appeasement of the Germans. Neville
Chamberlain was now prime minister, having succeeded Baldwin on May
28, 1937, and he was strongly of the view that the Germans had many
legitimate grievances, that it would not be in the interest of the world
for the powers to insist obstinately on maintaining the status quo,
and that every conceivable step should be taken to avert war. His position
in the May crisis had actually been a good deal less firm than it seemed,
and he took pains afterward to make this plain. Through newspaper leaks
he let it be known that Britain saw merit in the' German position on
the Sudetenland. On Aug. 3, 1938, he dispatched the 1st Viscount Runciman
to Czechoslovakia to devise a formula that might satisfy Hitler. On
September 7, in a widely noticed editorial that was probably inspired
by the government, the London Times went so far as to suggest that the
Sudetenland might be allowed to secede and unite itself with Germany.
Hitler had meanwhile fixed October 1 as the date on which German forces
were to move on Czechoslovakia. By early September, increased agitation
by the Sudeten Nazis and the German press and radio gave notice that
some kind of climax was approaching. At a party rally in Nurnberg on
September 12, Hitler delivered a tirade against the Czechs. Observers
reported infantry and armored units moving to the frontiers, and this
time there was no question of the fact.
Berchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg
To avert the impending crisis, Chamberlain resolved
to meet face to face with Hitler. Although he was, 69 years old and
had never been in an airplane before, he telegraphed the German dictator
offering to fly over at once, and on September 15, Hitler met him at
Berchtesgaden. There the prime minister asked if Germany would be satisfied
by the cession to her of the Sudetenland. When assured that this was
the case, he promised to press such a solution on the French and the
Czechs. He returned to London sure that a basis for peace had been found
and convinced, too, as he noted in a private memorandum, "that
here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word."
On September 18, the premier and foreign minister of France, Edouard
Daladier and Georges Bonnet, came to the British capital. Although in
the past they had said repeatedly that France would stand by Czechoslovakia,
the question of whether or not to repeat this assurance had been debated
in their cabinet throughout the day of September 13 without a decision
being reached. Their military advisers had warned that the French armies
alone could not carry out offensive operations, and that France would
still be defenseless in the face of German air attacks. The Czech Army,
though 800,000 strong, was not credited with ability to maintain prolonged
resistance. Only Soviet troops were in a position to come directly to
the aid of Czechoslovakia, and although the USSR had indicated that
it would dispatch such troops, they could arrive only by way of Rumania
or Poland. Both of these countries had indicated firmly that they would
not grant rights of passage, and the Poles had said on September 12
that they would not honor their alliance with France if France were
swept into war on account of Czechoslovakia. Daladier and Bonnet were
eager therefore to explore any road that might lead to peace. They gave
approval to the formula that Chamberlain had brought back from Berchtesgaden,
and on September 19 the British and French governments joined in urging
the Czechs to accept it.
The initial response from Prague was negative. The government
of President Eduard Benes was well aware that in sacrificing the Sudetenland
Czechoslovakia would lose not only valuable resources and industrial
plants but also her only natural defenses against Germany, and Benes
had thus far employed every device to prevent its loss. But this initial
response was not the final one. Fearful as they were of the Germans,
Czech leaders were even more frightened of the Russians. Further dispatches
from London and Paris impressed on them the fact that even if the Western
democracies went to war in their behalf, British and French troops would
not come to Czechoslovakia. Soviet troops, on the other hand, might
do so. There were persistent hints from Moscow that they would force
their way through Rumania or Poland. The general feeling among Czech
leaders was that, if so, they would never withdraw. The cabinet, or
at least some part of it, decided that the course of wisdom was to accept
the sacrifices urged by the British and French. Declaring that he was
acting with the knowledge of Benes, Premier Milan Hodza communicated
secretly with Bonnet, requesting a statement that France would not defend
Czechoslovakia if the Anglo-French proposals were rejected. With this
in hand, he indicated, it would be possible for the cabinet to justify
acceptance of them. Bonnet complied, and on September 21 the Czechs
gave notice that they would agree to the terms which Chamberlain and
Hitler had devised at Berchtesgaden.
Delighted, Chamberlain arranged for another meeting
with the furer, this time at Bad Godesberg on the Rhine. When he arrived
on September 22, however, he found to his dismay that the Berchtesgaden
terms no longer satisfied Hitler. The German now demanded not only that
the Sudetenland be ceded to Germany but that it be turned over to her
immediately: before 2 P.M. on September 28. Since Chamberlain had envisaged
a survey of the area by an international commission and German-Czech
negotiations to determine new boundaries, this meant the ruin of all
he had arranged. On September 23, he left for home, heavyhearted and
doubtful that war could be averted.
Munich
For the next few days, Europe seemed on the verge of
war. The Czechs mobilized. Daladier and Bonnet came again to London,
where they were assured more or less definitively of British support.
They in turn promised backing to the Czechs. On September 26, Hitler
spoke at the Sportspalast in Berlin, proclaiming in violent language
that the Sudeten issue would be solved in a matter of days, if necessary
by force. On the following day, the British cabinet ordered partial
mobilization. Air-raid shelters began to go up in London. Chamberlain
expressed his attitude in a radio address to the British people. "How
horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches
and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country
between people of whom we know nothing!" Grasping at straws, he
wrote again to Hitler and sent a message to Mussolini requesting Italian
influence on behalf of a peaceful settlement. President Roosevelt on
September 26 appealed to Hitler to negotiate with the other Europeans.
While the German leader had hoped that France would
not act and had counted on the British not to do so, he told intimates
that he was ready to make war if it proved necessary. His generals were
almost unanimous in holding that Germany was not in fact ready to fight
against Czechoslovakia, France, Britain, and probably the USSR, but
Hitler appeared to have little regard for their opinions. On the morning
of September 28, he seemed prepared to carry out his threat, come what
might. Before the 2 P.M. deadline, however, he received Chamberlain's
new message, a communication from the French ambassador which indicated
that France would go to almost any length to avoid war, and a message
from Mussolini proposing an Anglo-French-GermanItalian conference to
compose the issue. Informing the Western governments that he would postpone
his deadline until October 1 (the date fixed by his original plans),
he agreed to accept the duce's suggestions.
The conference met at Munich on September 29-30. A new
plan was put forward by Mussolini. Since it had actually been drawn
up in Berlin, Hitler said that he found it a satisfactory basis for
negotiation. Chamberlain and Daladier accepted it with few amendments.
The four leaders affixed their signatures, and Chamberlain returned
to London to declare that he brought back "peace with honour,"
adding, "I believe it is peace in our time." The Munich agreement
stipulated that the Germans should occupy the Sudetenland by October
10; that an international commission, representing the four powers and
Czechoslovakia, should arrange the transfer and draw new boundaries
not only there but also on the Czech-Polish and Czech-Hungarian frontiers;
and that afterward all four powers would guarantee these new frontiers.
Dominated by the Germans, the commission awarded to Germany all the
border area that had been shown as German in the AustroHungarian census
of 1910. This included approximately 10,000 square miles and 3,500,000
persons. The commission also approved Polish seizure of the Teschen
(Cieszyn, Min) region, which took place on October 2, and on November
2 awarded to Hungary a strip of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia. The
deed to the Poles covered about 400 square miles and 240,000 persons;
that to Hungary, about 5,000 square miles and 1,000,000 persons.
See also MUNICH CONFERENCE.
End of Appeasement
Hitler, of course, was not satisfied with the Munich
settlement. On October 21, only three weeks after signing the accord,
he advised his generals that one of their next tasks would be "liquidation
of the remainder of Czechoslovakia." Another was the seizure of
Memel (Klaipeda) , a port on the Baltic Sea which had been taken from
Germany and placed under League of Nations auspices in 1919 and had
been seized by Lithuania in 1923. While plans for these undertakings
were being prepared, he opened a diplomatic offensive on still another
front, notifying the Polish government on October 24 that he wished
revisions in the statute for the Free City of Danzig (Gdansk), road
and rail corridors through Polish territory to connect Germany with
Danzig, and extraterritorial rights in these corridors for German subjects.
In western European capitals, even while joy over Munich
was at its height, there was some suspicion about Hitler's future intentions.
Daladier was skeptical from the outset that the settlement would last.
Reports from intelligence sources soon aroused similar doubts in members
of the British government. Official and public opinion in both countries
veered toward the view that appeasement had been given its final trial-that
the Munich accords were the last concessions that could be made, and
that further demands by Hitler would call for forthright opposition.
In March 1939, this changed mood was put to the test. Hitler had paid
no attention to diplomats' warnings of it. The French had signed with
him on Dec. 6, 1938, a joint declaration guaranteeing the Franco-German
frontier and promising the settlement of future differences by consultation.
The British had made overtures for economic accords. Though meant as
earnests of desire to make the Munich settlement work, these gestures
were interpreted by Hitler as further evidence of spinelessness, and
when he next acted, he did so more brazenly than on any occasion in
the past.
Having given encouragement earlier to Slovakian separatists,
on March 11, 1939, he sent Austrian Nazis to Slovakia to order the Slovakians
to proclaim their independence and ask him to become their protector.
In the meantime, the Czech president, Emil Hacha, asked to see the fuhrer.
He was invited to Berlin and given an audience in the early morning
hours of March 15. An almost incredible scene ensued. Hitler told Hacha
that there were only two choices: Czechoslovakia could ask to be occupied
peacefully, or it could be invaded and its people made to suffer. The
furer's deputies literally chased Hacha around a 'table, trying to force
him to sign a proclamation requesting establishment of a German protectorate.
When the aged Czech fainted, he was revived with injections. Finally
he signed. Hitler immediately ordered his troops to move, and on March
16 he was in Prague, proclaiming that Czechoslovakia no longer existed.
Both the Czech and the Slovakian regions became German protectorates.
In accordance with a prior understanding the largest part of the Carpatho-Ukraine
was turned over to Hungary.
The reactions in Western capitals were mixed. The fact
that Hacha had invited German intervention made it hard for the French
and the British to do more than protest the violation of the spirit
of Munich. On the other hand, even the firmest believers in appeasement
were shocked by Hitler's seizing new territory after having said so
vehemently that he had no further ambitions and especially by his taking
into the Reich 10,000,000 persons who were not of German nationality.
The majority of the French cabinet now agreed immediately that, when
he moved again, Hitler would have to be stopped by force. At Birmingham
on March 17, Chamberlain declared that if the recent German action proved
merely a prelude to other attacks on small states, Britain would join
in resisting "to the utmost of its power."
The nation most likely to be Hitler's next target was
Poland. On January 9, Hitler had renewed his. demands with regard to
Danzig, coupling with them a secret communication suggesting that Poland
might in return obtain eventual cessions of territory in the Soviet
Ukraine. On February 1, the Poles refused. On March 21, however, Hitler
notified them in threatening language that the Danzig issue would have
to be settled. Two days later, German troops seized Memel. The French
and British had already indicated that they were prepared to negotiate
an alliance with Poland. ` The chief stumbling block was the question
of whether or not the USSR should be included. Through the commissar
for foreign affairs, Maksim M. Litvinov, the Soviets had expressed a
desire to be a party to the alliance. Polish leaders, however, looked
on this offer with apprehension fully equal to that which had been shown
by the Czechs. While exhibiting eagerness for ties with the British
and French, they still said firmly that they would not permit Soviet.
troops to cross their soil. Although most members of the French and
British cabinet wanted to form a common front with Poland and the USSR,
they concluded that it would be dangerous to wait for a change in the
Polish stand. On March 23, as a warning to, Hitler, the two governments
had declared that they would defend Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland
against any attack. This pledge had been made without any quid pro quo,
and Daladier and Chamberlain decided that their simplest course was
to follow the same procedure with regard to Poland. The British prime
minister asked if the Poles would have any objection. They said no,
and on March 31, Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons:
“In the event of any action which clearly threatened
Polish independence and which the Polish government accordingly considered
it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government
would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all
support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance
to this effect. I may add that the French government have authorized
me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in the matter...”
On April 7, Mussolini, imitating Hitler's tactics, invaded
Albania. The British and French governments on April 13 extended their
guarantee to Greece and Rumania. Abandoning their earlier policies altogether,
they now stood ready to go to war automatically if the dictators committed
new acts of aggression.
Nazi-Soviet Pact
The Western powers were still desirous of having the
USSR on their side. All hope of attaching Italy to their cause had disappeared.
On January 4, Mussolini had told Hitler that he was ready to negotiate
a comprehensive alliance. Although this so-called Pact of Steel, pledging
each nation to join the other immediately in war, was not completed
until May 22, Mussolini meanwhile made no secret of where he stood.
Chamberlain and Daladier had received some encouragement from the United
States. Roosevelt had opened a campaign to repeal the Neutrality acts
of 1935-1937 so that American supplies would be available to Britain
and France if war came, but he was to find it impossible for the time
being to carry Congress with him. In any event, there was no likelihood
whatever of early American intervention in their behalf. If there was
to be another power allied with them, it could only be the USSR.
Despite Polish opposition, the French and British had
continued to discuss a pact with the Soviets. On April 15, the French
suggested that the two Western powers and the USSR sign a treaty, containing
pledges of mutual assistance in the event of war. Thus, while the Soviets
would not have any engagement with Poland, they would be obligated to
fight for her if the French and British did so. ' After a long delay
resulting partly from concern about Poland's role, partly from distrust
of the Soviets, and partly, in all probability, from latent hope for
a war between Nazis and Communists in which the democracies could stand
aside, Chamberlain's cabinet agreed to. the French plan. The proposal
was made to the Russians, and on May 27 negotiations began in Moscow.
Troubled from the outset by the issue of whether or not the three-power
agreement should explicitly recognize a Russian right of passage through
Poland, the negotiations eventually foundered. They were finally suspended
on Aug. 21, 1939.
In the meantime, other negotiations had been in progress
between the Soviets and the Germans. After giving various subtle indications
that Munich had undermined his hope of cooperation with the Western
powers, Stalin on March 10 made a speech summarizing the principles
of his foreign policy as:
(1) To continue to pursue a policy of peace and consolidation
of economic relations with all, countries.
(2) Not to let our country be drawn into conflict by warmongers, whose
custom it is to let others pull their chestnuts out of the fire.
On May 3, Litvinov was replaced by Vyacheslav M. Molotov,
a man who had had no part in the effort to win alliances with the democracies.
Speaking with the German ambassador on May 20, the new foreign commissar
remarked that mutually profitable economic agreements might be reached
if a suitable "political basis" were
established.
Although Hitler understood these hints, he was slow
to act on them. Not until late in May did he authorize exploratory conversations
about a trade pact and related matters. After these went on for some
weeks without result, on June 29 he abruptly ordered that they be broken
off. On July 18, he learned of Russian proposals for resumption of the
talks. Eight days later, his foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop,
spent an evening sounding out some Russian officials who were in Berlin.
Encouraged by the results of these and other conversations, Hitler decided
on a bold gamble. On August 14, he had Ribbentrop propose to the Russians
"a speedy clarification of German-Russian relations . . . in due
course clarifying jointly territorial questions in Eastern Europe."
Now the supplicated rather than the suppliants, the Soviets raised a
number of practical issues. In each instance, Hitler responded satisfactorily.
By August 20, terms had been agreed on, and on August 23, Molotov and
Ribbentrop signed a non-aggression pact in Moscow. The published text
bound both governments to refrain from aggressive action or attack against
each other, to lend no support to a third party should either "become
the object of belligerent action" by one, and to join in no "grouping
of Powers whatsoever which is aimed directly or indirectly at the other
Party." A secret protocol stipulated that if "territorial
and political transformation" should take place in northeastern
Europe, the boundary between German and Soviet spheres should follow
the northern border of Lithuania and the line of the Narew (Narev),
Vistula (Visla ), and San rivers in Poland.
Thus was a temporary diplomatic revolution effected.
The Nazi and Soviet dictatorships became allies. Among the great powers
only the British and French remained as potentially active opponents
of German expansion. After the signature of the pact with the USSR,
Hitler reportedly exclaimed, "Now, I have the world in my pocket!"
Final Crisis
On April 3, Hitler had directed his generals to prepare
a plan of campaign against Poland, with September 1 as its probable
starting date. On May 23, in a conference with topranking officers,
he disclosed that his intention was to use the Danzig question as a
pretext and "to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity."
Meeting Mussolini's foreign minister at Obersalzberg on August-12-13,
Hitler stated that he intended to move against Poland before the end
of the month, and that he was confident that Britain and France would
not intervene. He expressed this conviction to others. After learning
that the pact with the Soviets would become a reality, however, he convoked
his generals at Obersalzberg and, in the course of a long, rambling
speech, told them that while he did not foresee war in the west it was
a risk that had to be run. In any event, he said, delay worked to Germany's
disadvantage. If the British and French did nothing about Poland, he
intended to strike against them soon after the Polish campaign was over.
Economically and militarily, he said, they would profit from further
respite while Germany would not. He ordered that the armies be ready
on August 26 to move against Poland and, if necessary, to hold the western
frontier against an Anglo-French attack. But on August 25, two days
after the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the French warned him once again that they
would stand by Poland, and on the same day Chamberlain announced the
signature of a formal Anglo-Polish alliance. Hitler wavered. Saying
that he needed time for negotiation, he ordered the postponement of
the operation.
His chosen pretext had been alleged grievances of the
German population in Danzig. Clamor there for annexation by Germany
and for establishment of road and rail corridors had been augmented
since July as a result of the dispatch to the city of several hundred
Nazi agents provocateurs. Citing the evidence of this agitation, Hitler
addressed to Chamberlain a long appeal for understanding and sympathy.
Obviously hoping against hope that a peaceful solution would emerge,
the British prime minister pressed the Poles to make every concession.
They agreed reluctantly to negotiate about the issues Hitler raised.
When their ambassador in Berlin gave notice to this effect, however,
Hitler refused to deal with him unless he had full powers to reach a
settlement on the spot. Exploiting this pretext, he declared to the
British and French governments that it was not he but the Poles who
were rejecting diplomacy. When the government in Warsaw ordered mobilization
on August 30, the German press and radio cried that it was planning
an attack. On the following day, there occurred a small incident on
the German side of the Polish frontier. According to Hitler's subsequent
speech, Polish soldiers attacked a German radio station at Gleiwitz
(now Gliwice). Actually the attackers were Germans outfitted in Polish
uniforms, commanded by an SS officer, and acting on orders from Berlin.
Hitler had already given the final directive for the
invasion to begin at dawn on September 1. It was well under way before
he•delivered a radio address throwing all blame on the Poles and
saying that he had had to meet force with force. When the French and
British demanded that he recall his troops, he refused. On September
3, Chamberlain and Daladier gave formal notice to Germany that a state
of war existed. The long armistice of 1918-19.39 was over.
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