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World War 2:
Between World Wars - Breakdown of the Versailles System
Manchurian Incident
Economic Issues
Rise of Hitler
Stresa Front
Anglo-German Naval Agreement
Italo-Ethiopian War
Hoare-Laval Plan
Rhineland Coup
Manchurian Incident
On Sept. 18, 1931, a small bomb exploded underneath
a section of track on the South Manchuria Railroad. The Japanese Army,
which under long-standing agreements policed the railroad, used this
incident as a pretext for launching operations aimed at conquering all
of Manchuria for Japan. The Chinese government, which had nominal sovereignty
over the area, protested to the League of Nations. Some supporters of
the principle of collective security saw an opportunity for the League
to prove that it was capable of stopping an aggressor. The majority
of member governments, however, did not, feeling that the fate of Manchuria
was not of vital concern to them, or that the Japanese had some justice
on their side, or that action by the League might harm moderates in
Tokyo who were trying to hold the army in check. In the upshot the Council
passed two resolutions, one on September 30 and the other on October
23, urging the Japanese to cease their military operations and enter
into direct negotiations with China and appointing a special commission
to investigate the situation and help the parties reach a settlement.
Paying little attention to the League's advice, the
Japanese continued their ,operations. When the Chinese organized a boycott
of Japanese goods, they went even further. Reinforcing the garrison
which they already maintained at Shanghai, in January 1932 they seized
control of that city. By May they had been persuaded by League mediators
to reach a truce agreement with the Chinese in Shanghai, from which
their forces were gradually withdrawn. In the meantime, however, they
had convened in Manchuria a rump assembly and had it proclaim the independence
of the region, now to be called Manchukuo, on February 18. The new state,
which came into existence officially on March 1, signed with Japan on
September 15 a treaty making it a virtual ward of that country.
The first Western nation to show umbrage over these
events was the United States. Despite its isolationism it had a long
tradition of interest in the Far East. When the League Council convened
to hear the Chinese protests, the American government sent an official
observer to Geneva. The view in Washington at that time was that Western
powers ought not to do anything that might aggravate the political situation
in Tokyo, but Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson subsequently became
convinced that there ought to be some general assertion of opposition
to Japanese aggression.. Although himself in favor of threatening Japan
with collective sanctions, he had to reckon with the stubborn pacifism
of President Herbert Hoover. The most that he could do was, on Jan.
7, 1932, to dispatch a formal note to Tokyo, declaring that the United
States would not recognize Japanese sovereignty over territory acquired
by force. This formulation was termed variously the Stimson Doctrine
and the Hoover Doctrine. Although one of the arguments used by opponents
of League action had been the fact that the United States was not a
member of the organization, the American initiative attracted little
immediate support. When asked by Stimson to make a similar declaration,
the British government declined. Not until after the evacuation of Shanghai
did British statesmen even suggest that the League might adopt the Stimson
Doctrine as its own.
The sessions of the League Assembly in the fall and
winter of 1932-1933 were devoted largely to the Manchurian issue. The
commission of inquiry, headed by the 2d earl of Lytton, made its report,
stating that while the Japanese had possessed some grievances their
action had been excessive, that the establishment of an independent
Manchukuo had not been in accordance with the wishes of the people,
and that Japanese forces ought to return the rail lines, restore the
status quo ante bellum, and negotiate a new understanding about Manchuria
with the Chinese. After prolonged debate the Assembly adopted on Feb.
24, 1933, a resolution refusing to recognize Manchukuo and calling on
the Japanese to retire. The only result was to bring on March 27 the
resignation (effective in two years' time) of Japan from the League
of Nations. The system of collective security created by the Paris peace
treaties had been tested and been found wanting.
Economic Issues
In the meantime, a severe economic depression had developed.
A crash of the New York stock market in October 1929 had been followed
by a rapid decline in American production, employment, and foreign commerce.
The repercussions were soon felt in all countries that traded with the
United States and also in those where American funds were invested.
So far flung was the network of American commercial and financial relationships
that by 1931 people were speaking of a world depression.
It had soon become clear that most European governments
would be unable to continue making payments on World War I debts. Ever
since the early 1920's, British statesmen had been urging that the United
States forgive all or part of what was owed by her wartime allies, proposing
that they in turn remit some or all of the payments due them from Germany
as reparations. The American government had rejected this proposal,
but in 1931, faced with the depression, President Hoover relented and
arranged for a one-year moratorium on both debt and reparation payments.
Seeking reelection in 1932, he dared not repeat the experiment. Some
of the debtor states were forced to default. In the end all but Finland
did so, and the result was not only to embarrass the governments involved
but also to strengthen isolationist feeling in the United States.
Eventually almost all the affected states sought solutions
for their economic problems in independent, nationalistic action. Seeking
a commercial and financial advantage over other countries, the British
abandoned the gold standard and devalued the pound in 1931. Through
agreements reached in a conference held at Ottawa on July 21-Aug. 21,
1932, they also abandoned the tradition of free trade and established
preferential tariffs for the Commonwealth. The American government deserted
the gold standard in 1933 and in the same year caused the failure of
the London Monetary and Economic Conference by declaring that it would
not join in an agreement to stabilize exchange rates. Fascist Italy
adopted more drastic measures, instituting rigid economic controls and
creating jobs by enlarging the armed forces and accelerating weapons
production. Germany, which was ruled after Jan. 30, 1933, by the National
Socialist (Nazi) dictator Adolf Hitler, went even farther in the same
directions. The community of nations envisioned in the Paris peace treaties
dissolved into an anarchy of jealous states seeking national advantage
and national self-sufficiency.
See also REPARATIONS.
Rise of Hitler
By far the most ominous event of these depression years
was the emergence of Hitler in Germany. A psychopathic personality,
he rejected all conventional moral standards. In his book Mein Kampf
(2 vols., 19251927, q.v.) and in later speeches he had disclosed his
abhorrence of such concepts as equality and majority rule, his hatred
of Jews, his belief that "Aryans" were a "master race"
entitled to dominate others, and his conviction that the state had a
right to use any means to achieve its ends. He had also set forth his
views on foreign policy. He held that Germany should expand in order
to bring within it all Europeans of German nationality. Saying also
that the German people needed Lebensraum (space for living), he indicated
that it was to be found in eastern Europe. At the same time he declared
that Germany had to have "a final active reckoning with France."
His words showed that he desired German hegemony over Europe and would
have no scruples about the methods he used.
The other nations of Europe viewed him with alarm but
also with uncertainty. Few could believe that he really meant what he
said, or that once in office he would not become more restrained, more
conventional, and more prudent. At first his actions justified this
opinion. While he carried out the domestic programs he had advocated,
succeeding soon in abolishing all but the forms of democracy and constituting
himself furer (leader) of the German people, externally he followed
courses somewhat at odds with what he had said and written. In token
of peaceful intentions he even negotiated with Poland an agreement relating
to the large German minority in that country. In a joint declaration
issued on Jan. 26, 1934, the German and Polish governments promised
for a period of 10 years not to resort to war to solve differences and
not to intervene in behalf of members of their nationality groups who
were not legally citizens of their states.
Until the summer of 1934 the only actions of Hitler
that excited international apprehension were those concerning armaments.
As part of the campaign to revive the German economy, he undertook to
increase production by heavy industry,. particularly those branches
that would make the greatest contributions to a war effort. In May 1933,
he asked the other League powers to allow Germany to move immediately
toward the "equality" which had been promised her for the
distant future. The French refused, pointing out that the promise had
always been conditioned on the development of effective international
controls. Hitler replied by declaring on October 14' that Germany would
proceed to arm herself with or without consent. He announced on the
same day his nation's withdrawal (effective in two years' time) from
the League of Nations. But the effect of these actions was softened
by an offer to France of a bilateral pact in which Germany would agree
to limit its army to 300,000 men and its air force to 50 percent of
that of France and to accept some measure of international control.
Although the French refused this offer, taking the position that they
should not sanction German rearmament even in principle,. the fact that
the offer had been made left it unclear whether or not Hitler was bent
on carrying out the external programs outlined in Mein
Kampf.
The first strong indication that this might be the case
came in July 1934 in Austria. That country had a National Socialist
Party modeled on Hitler's and more or less openly supported by German
officials. In the spring of 1934, the party increased its agitation.
Then, when Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss was assassinated on July 25,
it attempted a coup d'etat. German official statements and troop movements
made it seem that the coup would have active support from across the
frontier. The Austrian Nazis had, however, overestimated their strength.
Dollfuss' successor, Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg, quickly consolidated
his power. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini meanwhile declared that
Italy would not tolerate a change in the status of Austria and moved
Italian troops to the Brenner Pass. Whatever plans the Germans had were
frustrated by these actions.
See also NATIONAL SOCIALIST (NAZI) PARTY.
Stresa Front
The French became increasingly apprehensive as evidence
accumulated to indicate that Hitler planned much more formidable forces
than those of which he had spoken in October and November 1933. On March
10, 1935, one of his officials disclosed that the projected German Air
Force would be larger than the French. Six days later, Hitler himself
proclaimed the reinstitution of compulsory military service.
To cope with the prospective peril, the French had begun
to mature a strategy. Foreign Minister Louis Barthou summarized it as
an effort "to group the European interests that could be menaced
by the rapid revival of Germany." Although Barthou was assassinated
at Marseille on Oct. 9, 1934, in company with King Alexander I of Yugoslavia,
his policy was carried on ( albeit somewhat irresolutely) by his successor,
Pierre Laval. To begin with, in January 1935, Laval held formal conversations
with Mussolini, seeking a common Franco-Italian front. These conversations
were welcomed by the Italian dictator. Soon after the emergence of Hitler
he had proposed that Italy, France, Great Britain, and Germany agree
to procedures by which they alone, bypassing the League of Nations,
might revise the Treaty of Versailles. The French and British had declined,
and the resultant Four-Power Pact initialed at Rome on June 7, 1933
(signed on July 15), provided for nothing more than consultation on
matters of mutual interest. Now the growth of French apprehension about
Hitler gave Italy more leverage.
Mussolini's principal aim was to circumvent the provisions
of the League Covenant that might give protection to Ethiopia, for he
had been trying unsuccessfully since the early 1920's to make that nation
an economic colony of Italy, and at some point before 1933 he had decided
to attempt its forcible conquest. He feared that, since Ethiopia had
been admitted to the League in 1923, it might be able to win that body's
support, but he recognized that if the British and French did not join
in collective resolutions and sanctions, these would be ineffectual.
A clash between Italian and Ethiopian troops at the watering hole of
Wal Wal on Dec. 5, 1934, had just given him a potential casus belli.
To Ethiopia's appeal for League arbitration he had rejoined that he
would settle the incident exclusively in Italy's interest. Now the trip
of Laval to Rome, seeking Italian support against Hitler, gave him the
opportunity to bargain for the acquiescence of France and perhaps, through
France, of Britain.
The formal convention signed by Laval and Mussolini
on Jan. 7, 1935, said nothing about Ethiopia: it merely resolved certain
issues with regard to French and Italian colonies already existing in
Africa. Mussolini declared later, however, that Laval had given him
verbal assurance of a free hand in Ethiopia, and Laval himself admitted
that he had promised not to interfere with Italian economic penetration
there. The Frenchman professed not to have made any commitment with
regard to political or military penetration, but what was said and left
unsaid gave Mussolini warrant for interpreting the conversations as
he did, and he accelerated preparations for war, apparently much less
concerned now about interference by the League.
Laval had gotten what he had sought. Another convention,
signed on the same day, affirmed that France and Italy would jointly
keep watch on events in Austria and confer about common action if that
nation were imperiled, and it was agreed that Mussolini should invite
the British to a meeting at Stresa, with the object of adding them to
the anti-German front. This conference, held on April 11-44, 1935, was
a partial success. All three governments joined in a commitment to oppose,
"by all practicable means, any unilateral repudiation of treaties
which may endanger the peace of Europe." While this commitment
was qualified by a provision requiring the use of League machinery,
it seemed a direct warning to Hitler. The Stresa declaration was followed,
moreover, by action to open a League debate on the question of whether
or not Germany's reinstitution of compulsory military service constituted
a unilateral breach of the Treaty of Versailles. On April 17, the Council,
with only one abstention (that of Denmark) voted in principle its condemnation
of all unilateral violations of treaties and referred the German case
to the Assembly.
Meanwhile, Laval began negotiations with the ambassador
of the USSR in Paris. On May 2, they announced the signature of a five-year
pact pledging mutual assistance in the event that either nation. was
the victim of aggression. This was followed on May 16 by a similar pact
between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Coupled with the earlier
treaties that allied Poland and the Little Entente with France, these
accords seemed to close the ring around Nazi Germany, and they were
accompanied by movements within all the major European governments to
increase spending on armaments. In June 1935, the French ambassador
in Berlin, Andre FrancoisPoncet, reported the German leaders to be more
"defeated and discouraged" than he had ever seen them.
Anglo-German Naval Agreement
The so-called Stresa front was short lived. Some members
of the British government reacted to the evidence of German rearmament
by drawing the moral that the nation should detach itself and avoid
such enforced involvement in war as that of 1914. Finding the German
government full of protestations of goodwill for Britain, members of
this group reasoned that the course of prudence was to eliminate all
potential Anglo-German issues. One that had embittered relations between
the two countries in pre-World War I years had been naval rivalry, and
when the Admiralty reported exchanges with the Germans that revealed
the possibility of a bilateral compact on the relative size of the two
fleets, considerable official sentiment developed in favor of following
it up. This was done, though in the most closely guarded secrecy, and
on June 18, 1935, a naval pact with Germany was signed. It provided
that Germany could build a fleet of capital ships equal in tonnage to
one third, and a fleet of submarines equal to 60 percent, of that of
the Royal Navy. In view of the fact that the Treaty of Versailles had
set other limits on German naval strength and had forbidden the construction
of submarines, these terms constituted acceptance by Britain of Germany's
repudiation of those articles. Coming barely two months after the Stresa
accords, this pact gave evidence that the nations apparently joined
against Germany were in fact far from united.
Nor did the Franco-Soviet accord prove more durable.
Laval had always doubted the wisdom of the Barthou policy and inclined
toward the view that France might be better off in league with Germany
than against her. On Jan. 13, 1935, the plebiscite promised by the Treaty
of Versailles had taken place in the Saar, with more than 90 percent
of the voters opting for reunion with Germany, and Laval not only accepted
the verdict with good cheer but made the point to diplomats that France
would not necessarily be intransigent in all matters that affected Germany.
Instead of seeking prompt ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact by
the French Parliament, he held it over (it was carried through that
body by his successor, Albert Sarraut, in February 1936), meanwhile
evading all suggestions from the Soviet capital of a military convention
to supplement it and to make clear how it might be carried out. The
Soviets were pressing Laval onto delicate ground, it is true, for a
military convention would involve such issues as whether or not Soviet
troops could move across Poland or Rumania, and Laval, who had become
premier on June 7, 1935, was looking forward uneasily to a national
election and to the possibility that the opposition Popular Front, of
which the Communists were part, might profit from a closer Franco-Soviet
tie. Nevertheless, his hesitancies provided further evidence that the
unity of Europe against Germany might be an illusion.
Italo-Ethiopian War
Although the British at Stresa had given Mussolini no
assurances that they would acquiesce in his conquest of Ethiopia, their
reticences had been so interpreted by him, and he was strengthened in
this view when, in June 1935, Anthony Eden, minister for League of Nations
affairs, came to Rome to suggest that Britain might cede to Ethiopia
part of British Somaliland so that Ethiopia might in turn appease Italy
by ceding to it some land adjacent to Italian Somaliland. Eden even
suggested that a way might be found to make Ethiopia a virtual economic
protectorate of Italy. Mussolini soon learned that these gestures did
not necessarily mean what he thought. When he rejected Eden's proposals
and continued preparations for war, the British government moved warships
into the Mediterranean Sea as if in preparation for a League vote of
sanctions against Italy. On September 11, after Foreign Secretary Sir
Samuel Hoare addressed the League Assembly and declared firmly that
Britain would be "second to none" in fulfilling her obligations
under the Covenant, Mussolini was faced with the very contingency that
he thought his diplomacy had prevented: the possibility of League intervention
in behalf of Ethiopia. He nevertheless moved forward. When Emperor Haile
Selassie ordered Ethiopian mobilization on September 29, he responded
by proclaiming national mobilization in Italy. On October 3, his armies
attacked from Eritrea and thus opened war.
In Geneva the League Council immediately heard the protests
of Haile Selassie's representative. On October 7, with Italy alone abstaining,
it voted to condemn Mussolini's aggression as a resort to war in defiance
of Article 12 of the Covenant. Referred to the Assembly, this resolution
on October 11 won the support of 50 of the 54 members, only Italy and
her client states, Albania, Austria, and Hungary, opposing it. It remained
for a Coordination Committee of the League to determine . what sanctions
should be imposed. Here practical rather than moral issues arose, for,
as a totalitarian state that had endeavored for more than a decade to
achieve national self-sufficiency, Fascist Italy could withstand almost
all forms of moral and economic pressure. The only sanctions that would
do it serious injury would be closure of the Suez Canal, which would
block the sending of reinforcements and supplies, and stoppage of the
one vital commodity that Italy had to import in quantity, oil.
Fearing that closure of the canal would lead to war
with Italy, the British government, which controlled the waterway, had
little inclination to take that step. As for oil, it was doubtful whether
a League decree could be effective in view of the fact that the leading
producer, the United States, was not bound by the Covenant. Although
Congress had enacted a so-called Neutrality Act (signed on Aug. 31,
1935), which required embargoes to be laid on exports of munitions to
nations at war, it did not apply to petroleum products. While President
Franklin D. Roosevelt declared on November 15 that oil and other commodities
were "essential war materials" and ought to be included, there
was no assurance that American exporters would adopt such a "moral
embargo," or that if they did not, Congress would amend the law
to cover these items. The American government encouraged the League
powers to expect cooperation but could not guarantee it.
When the Coordination Committee brought in its report
on October 19, it made only five relatively mild recommendations for
sanctions against Italy: embargoes on shipments of arms to her; bans
on loans and credits; bans on imports from her; embargoes on exports
to her of transport animals, rubber, and a variety of metals; and joint
aid to nations that suffered economically as a result of taking these
steps. Voted on separately in the Assembly, they were approved by majorities
respectively of 50, 49, 48, 48, and 39. Since their practical effect
would be slight, the chief hope was that the display of unity in world
opinion would impress Mussolini and cause him to change his course.
It did not.
Hoare-Laval Plan
As Italian military operations continued, sentiment
grew, especially in Britain, for more effective action. Between January
and June 1935, a so-called Peace Ballot, a national referendum supported
by the British League of Nations Union and allied groups, had yielded
6,784,368 votes endorsing the principle that, if one nation insisted
on attacking another, the other nations should combine to employ not
only economic but also military sanctions (10,027,608 favored economic
sanctions alone). Although this total encompassed a substantial percentage
of the electorate, the result had been discounted by most politicians
on the ground that the ballot had probably not been understood fully
by its signers. Now, however, they began to consider that it had been
more significant. Campaigning in a general election, spokesmen for the
government felt obliged to use increasingly vigorous words in speaking
of what Britain and the League would do. Returned on November 14 with
an overwhelming majority of seats in the House of Commons (431 to 184),
the Conservative cabinet was under pressure to live up to its promises.
Those ministers who were dubious about the whole policy
of sanctions found this pressure especially onerous. They urged a further
effort to induce Mussolini to abandon the war and thus, they hoped,
to rescue Britain from the predicament in which she was likely soon
to find herself. Precisely what was said and agreed on within the cabinet
remains unknown. The result was, however, that Hoare set off in early
December for a skating holiday in Switzerland, and that he paused for
two days (December 7-8) in Paris for intensive conversations with Laval.
The result of these conversations was an agreement on proposals to be
made secretly to Mussolini. He was to be asked to halt the war with
the understanding that Italy would receive from Ethiopia the northeastern
section of the Tigre, part of the desert of Danakil, all of the Ogaden
region, and "exclusive economic rights" in the country south
of 8° north latitude and east of 35° east longitude. All that
Italy would yield in return would be a corridor giving Ethiopia a camel
track to the sea across almost impassable desert. This plan offered
Italy almost everything that she could hope to obtain by continuing
her campaign.
Convinced that the application of further sanctions
would lead to a general war harmful to French interests, Laval had devised
these terms. He had also developed the strategy to be followed. The
plan was to be put before Mussolini first. After he accepted, it was
to be shown to Haile Selassie. When the Ethiopian ruler rejected it,
the French and British would be able to say that he had refused peace,
and could not only oppose the imposition of further sanctions but also
call for the lifting of those that had already been voted. Whatever
the outcome for Ethiopia, the crisis between the League powers and Italy
would have been bridged, and some facsimile of the Stresa front might
be put together again. Even before they could be put into diplomatic
cables, however, the terms of the plan leaked to the press. From partisans
of Ethiopia and the League there arose an instant and loud outcry. The
British and French governments were accused of preparing to betray the
interests of a small nation, to sacrifice the principle of collective
security, and reward an aggressor. So strong was feeling in Britain
that Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin felt compelled on December 18 to
request Hoare's resignation and soon afterward to appoint as his successor
Eden, the champion of the League. In France, Laval's government barely
survived a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies on December
29. From the United States, where sentiment for effective embargoes
had been rapidly growing, came a torrent of criticism of British and
French shortsightedness.
Mussolini had meanwhile given indication that he would
not in any case accept less than the total conquest of Ethiopia. In
January 1936, there was discussion within the League of adding an oil
embargo to the sanctions. Despite the events that had followed the release
of the Hoare-Laval terms, however, official French and British opinion
was still opposed to such action. The decision was . for delay, pending
the outcome of Roosevelt's efforts to amend the American neutrality
laws. Since nothing encouraging was done by Congress, nothing at all
was done by the League. As it turned out, the limit of its capacities
had been reached in the vote of sanctions of October.. As winter turned
into spring, the Italian offensive in Ethiopia gained momentum. On May
5, 1936, Fascist troops marched into the capital, Addis Ababa. Four
days later, Mussolini proclaimed the war ended and Ethiopia part of
Italian East Africa. By summer most of the League powers had concluded
that they could only accept as a fact the extinction of Ethiopian sovereignty,
and the Assembly agreed that sanctions against Italy should be suspended
as of July 15. The League's machinery for maintaining collective security
had proved ineffectual.
Rhineland Coup
An even more significant demonstration of this fact
came before the ItaloEthiopian War was liquidated. Seeing the split
within the Stresa front, Hitler decided to act in the Rhineland-to repudiate
the articles of the Treaty of Versailles that declared that region permanently
demilitarized. When he communicated this decision to his generals, they
were appalled. In their view the German Army was still comparatively
weak, and the air force had relatively little offensive capability.
They warned the furer that the French had the power singlehandedly to
drive a German force from the region and impose humiliating terms. Hitler's
response was a simple assertion that the French would not move. He ordered
the requisite preparations made.
The legal pretext he found in the FrancoSoviet Pact
of 1935. By committing France to act against Germany in the event of
German aggression against the USSR, Hitler could argue, this pact constituted
a repudiation of the Locarno treaties, in which France had promised
never to make war on Germany except in obedience to resolutions by the
League of Nations. It also constituted a threat to Germany, he could
say, and therefore, despite the Treaty of Versailles, gave warrant for
action in self-defense. On March 7, 1936, shortly after the French Assembly's
ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact, he exposed this reasoning in
diplomatic notes and in a speech to the Reichstag. He announced that
German troops were moving into the demilitarized zone. At the same time,
he offered as measures of reassurance to sign nonaggression pacts with
France and all Germany's neighbors, east as well as west; to concert
with the French a new demilitarization agreement, applying to both sides
of the frontier; and to reenter the League of Nations.
The French government was shocked. Premier Sarraut responded
with a forceful radio address, declaring, "We shall not leave Strasbourg
under the German cannon." As he later testified, however, he and
his colleagues were uncertain as to what they would in fact do. Reports
by military men on France's capacity to repel the German force were
generally pessimistic. The army, they said, was inadequate. It would
be necessary to call up reservists in order to fill its ranks. Overestimating
the German bomber force, they warned that Paris and other centers lacked
the air defenses to prevent devastating raids. Their judgments thus
reinforced the feeling that had been instinctive among the principal
members of the cabinet that France dare not act alone, and that perhaps
she should not act even if she received support from abroad.
One capital with which they were particularly concerned
was Warsaw. On the day of Hitler's announcement the Polish government
gave them reassurance that in the event of a clash it would stand by
the alliance of 1921 and proposed immediate conversations. Two days
later, on March 9, however, it declared that it accepted the German
thesis and regarded the reoccupation of the Rhineland as a legitimate
response to the FrancoSoviet Pact. Their objective may have been merely
to emphasize that Polish support of France would constitute action above
and beyond the 1921 treaty, but the impression given the French government
was that the Poles were playing a double game, and that France could
not rely on them. The other nation whose support would be crucial to
the French in a clash with Germany was Great Britain, and while the
British government was more forthright than the Polish, it gave France
even less encouragement to stand fast. Eden declared the German action
to be inexcusable but not threatening, especially in view of Hitler's
offer of nonaggression pacts. Calling for a meeting of the League Council,
he said that no decision should be taken beforehand by any government.
The only promise he made was that Britain would support France if she
were attacked by Germany in the period before the League acted.
The French government was thus informed by its two most
important allies that it could not expect backing if it replied to the
Germans with force. Some members of the Sarraut cabinet found this news
not unwelcome. Perhaps most did, for they faced a general election in
May; they felt that a call-up of reservists would cost them votes; and,
in view of the identification of their Popular Front opponents with
antifascism, they feared that any crisis with Germany might have the
same effect. The French press, also preoccupied with domestic affairs,
raised little clamor for action. Consequently, on March 11, Sarraut
backed away from his earlier position, announcing that the cabinet had
decided to seek a solution within the framework of the League of Nations,
working in conjunction with the other signers of the Locarno Pact. The
League did in fact discuss a resolution condemning the German action.
Nothing came of this discussion, however, and the Rhineland question
was lost to sight in the pell-mell rush of other events. Hitler's coup
had succeeded. Not only the machinery of the League but also the French
system of alliances lay in ruins. There were no longer any collective
guarantees of the peace, and the end of the truce of 1918-1919 was in
sight.
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